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“it is important to learn to be surprised by simple things – for 
example, by the fact that bodies fall down, not up, and that they 
fall at a certain rate; that if pushed, they move on a flat surface in a 
straight line, not a circle; and so on. The beginning of science is the 
recognition that the simplest phenomena of life raise quite serious 
problems: Why are they as they are, instead of some different way?”  
(Chomsky 1988)
one of the leading intuition of noam chomsky’s research on language and 
cognition is that it is important to learn to be surprised by simple things. 
one can take the questions presented here as an example of this approach. 
the questions were proposed by undergraduate and graduate students, 
reorganized by us and presented to noam chomsky on occasion of his 
visit to the institute of advanced study in Pavia on september 15th, 2012. 
simply and spontaneously, the questions raised by the students clustered 
around a number of fundamental topics concerning the architecture 
of the language faculty, its relation with other systems. starting from 
the mathematical properties of language, chomsky answered students’ 
questions by discussing theoretical and epistemological consequences of 
the research on the biological foundation of language. he also posed new 
questions that such rational inquiry opens up and that can possibly get an 
answer in a future. The call for simplicity is reflected in the content of the 
answers chomsky provided, and in the style as well. the discourse unfolds 
smoothly guiding the hearer – and the reader – through leading issues in 
the Chomskyan approach, from the foundation of the field (Chomsky 2004) 
to the ultimate synthesis (chomsky 2011), across the milestones that made 
the scientific study of language possible in the modern era and still lucidly 
indicate where we should be heading to1.
1) Can we study evolution of language? Is there any evidence that language 
evolved?
the subject “evolution of language” is a very fashionable one. in the last 
1 this contribution contains the faithful transcript of chomsky’s seminar. the notes provide 
some additional references. although the contribution has been organized and revised by 
all authors, V. Bambini is responsible for questions 1-2, 8-11 and for the notes, while c. chesi 
for questions 3-7. We would like to thank the students who participated to the initiative and 
submitted their questions, and the collegio ghislieri in Pavia for hosting the seminar.
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several decades there is a huge literature, libraries of books, international 
conferences, papers pouring out all the time. there are a few problems 
about it. one problem is that the topic doesn’t exist. small problem… 
Furthermore, everyone knows it doesn’t exist. evolution involves changes 
in the genomic characters of the organism. languages are not organisms, 
they don’t have genomes, they don’t evolve. languages change, but they 
don’t evolve. What evolves is the language capacity of users of language, 
i.e., human beings. so problem number 1 is: the topic doesn’t exist. Problem 
number 2 is that the work that has been done on the topic is utterly unlike 
anything that has been done in evolutionary biology. For example, suppose 
a biologist submitted a paper on the evolution of the eye. consider that 
he has no idea of what an eye is and says that an eye is maybe something 
that you use to watch television. People would laugh. you couldn’t submit 
a paper like that. But that is exactly what the literature on the evolution of 
language is about. it doesn’t tell you what they think language is, just that 
language is something used for communication, which is about like saying 
that an eye is used to watch television. one of the many uses of language is 
communication, but that doesn’t tell you anything. other problems arise 
as soon as you begin to look at the work. For example, a lot of the work by 
really sophisticated people argues that frozen expressions in language 
are fossils from earlier periods. they tell you something about the earlier 
stages of language. it is usually english that is studied; so take a frozen 
expression in english. if it is a fossil, it is a fossil from a couple of hundred 
years ago, maybe a thousand years. What can that tell you about the history 
of language? nothing. that is a tiny blink of an eye in the last phase of a long 
history of language. 
the subject is one of the strangest subjects i have ever seen. now, there is a 
subject: evolution of the capacity to use language, or to acquire language, 
the human language faculty. that is the real subject. But there is a problem 
with that subject too: we don’t know anything about it. actually, we know 
two facts about the evolution of the language capacity. one of the facts is 
sufficient to tell you that the study of the evolution of language is mostly a 
waste of time. For example, one of the things we know about the evolution of 
the language capacity is that nothing has happened for at least 50 thousand 
years since humans left africa. and the evidence for this is pretty strong, 
in fact very compelling. if you take an infant from an amazonian tribe in 
Brazil, a tribe that maybe hasn’t had contact with other humans for maybe 
20 thousand years, the child first of all learns Portuguese instantly, with 
no problems, and if the infant was brought to Pavia, he would be speaking 
just like you, exactly the same. and conversely, if you take an infant here 
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and dump him in the amazon, he would speak exactly like the children of 
that tribe. We don’t know any deviation from this: not every case has been 
studied, but such a wide range of cases have been observed that it is almost 
certain that this is universal. What that tells you is that the capacity for 
language hasn’t evolved in a way beyond historic times back to the first 
humans leaving africa, or at least their ancestors, roughly 50 thousand 
years ago. so at least in that period there has been no evolution of the 
language capacity. 
The second fact that we know with not full confidence but kind of plausibility 
is that, if you go back quite a short period before that – a short time in the 
evolutionary time, maybe 50 or 100 thousand years before that, which is 
nothing in evolutionary time, there is no evidence that language existed at 
all. there is substantial archeological evidence that somewhere in that very 
narrow window, roughly 75 thousand years ago, there was a sudden explosion of 
evidence of creative activity, symbolic representation, indications of the phases 
of the moon, complex social organization, and various rituals, all sort of things 
that indicate that something happened in a very small group, maybe a small 
hunter-gatherer tribe, maybe a hundred people, and then spread. so, within 
again a short period of time, there was homo sapiens: in fact that is the origin of 
cognitive homo sapiens. Physical, anatomical homo sapiens, goes hundreds of 
thousand years back beyond that. But something happened cognitively in one 
small group and essentially took over. you can guess what the date is: within the 
last hundred thousand years probably. that tells you that some event took place, 
brief change which provided our ancestors with the creative capacities that 
we all have, and we all have essentially identically, because we are all different 
descendants from that small group who among their other talents succeeded 
in a way beyond everybody else. the human species is kind of unusual and all 
related species have been wiped out. there is no comparative evidence. there 
were plenty of other hominids – we know that from archeological evidence – 
but they are all gone. neanderthal lasted until maybe 30 thousand years ago 
(there is a very slight interbreeding with homo sapiens, mostly in southern 
italy, incidentally), but essentially everything else was wiped out. and in fact 
it goes beyond that. if you look at the spread of hominids, going back a million 
years or longer than that, as our ancestors spread, megafauna, i.e., big animals, 
disappeared. it was thought for a long time that it had to do with the expansion 
of the ice ages, but it turned out that, if you look at close dating, wherever proto-
humans appeared everything else disappeared. We are now in the process 
of finishing it off… The end result is that there is essentially no comparative 
evidence. there is evidence that something happened within a very short 
period, essentially suddenly from an evolutionary point of view, and nothing 
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has changed since. and that is the evidence. there is essentially no other 
evidence about the evolution of language2. 
if you take a look at the literature, what is studied is a different topic: 
language change. undoubtedly languages changed. We are not talking 
latin, we are not talking sanskrit, proto indo-european or whatever came 
before that. undoubtedly languages changed, but that is not evolution. if 
you want to study language change, that is a serious discipline. historical 
linguistics is a serious discipline, it has rigorous standards: you can’t 
say “maybe this happened, maybe that happened”. that doesn’t count in 
historical linguistics. But that is what the work is in so-called evolution of 
language; it is what evolutionary biologists sometime call “just so stories”: 
“maybe this happened, maybe something else happened”. that is not 
serious work. so, if there is something to learn, as i think there is, we can 
ask what small change could have taken place that could have given rise to 
something like the language faculty. there is linguistic work which i think 
shed some light on that. i won’t go into it. But we have to look for some 
small mutation that caused some rewiring of the brain that provided the 
essential properties of human language which don’t exist anywhere else. 
and i think there is work on it. Beyond that, to talk about the evolution of 
language is just cutting down forests for no purposes, as far as i can see.
2) Is there any new contribution from neuroscience to the understanding of 
language?
yes, there is. in fact the best work i know is andrea moro’s work. there 
is a fair amount of interesting work. But there is one result that is quite 
far-reaching and that is what has been done here3. cutting it down to its 
simplest form, it is something like this: taking speakers of some language, 
german let’s say, and presenting them with two kinds of non-sense 
languages, languages they don’t understand. one of them is modeled on 
say italian: it has the properties of italian, but non-sense words. the other 
is a language designed to violate what appear to be universal properties of 
language. the most interesting case that was studied, the one with the most 
far-reaching results, has to do with the linear order. For example, in italian, 
if you want to negate a sentence, there is a negative particle which appears 
in a certain position in the sentence and it has to appear in that position, 
a fairly complex position: the position is defined by various structural 
relationships. you can make up a non-sense language in which negation is 
2  For a paleoanthropological perspective, see tattersall (1998).
3  For a comprehensive presentation of this and other experiments on possible and impossible 
languages, see moro (2008).
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much simpler: you put it in a particular linear order, maybe say the third 
word of the sentence. if you want to negate a sentence, you take the sentence 
and put the negation particle in the third word. computationally, that is a 
lot simpler. But no human language works like that. every human language 
puts the negative particle in some structurally defined position, and this 
incidentally generalizes. linear distance counting doesn’t seem to exist in 
human language. There is nothing like third position or find the shortest, 
the closest word. i will give you  a simple example. take interpretation of 
adverbs in complex sentences: you can show it also in brief sentences. take 
the sentence “Eagles that swim fly”. Put the word “instinctively” in front of it: 
“Instinctively eagles that swim fly”. Everyone knows, every young child knows 
that “instinctively” goes with “fly”, it doesn’t go with “swim”. It doesn’t go with 
the closest verb. If it is “Instinctively eagles that fly swim”, you don’t understand 
“instinctively” to go with “fly”, although that is the only thing that makes any 
sense: you understand “instinctively” to go with “swim”. “instinctively” is not 
finding the closest verb: it is finding a remote one and one which happens to 
be the structurally closest by an abstract notion of distance. and that holds 
for every linguistic construction, every language. languages don’t use simple 
computational techniques like closest or third. they use complex computational 
techniques involving structural distance and structural position. again, 
universally. now, going back to the language modeled on italian and the 
invented language with the simple position for negation, say third position, 
moro and colleagues’ experiment found that normal speakers could solve the 
language modeled on italian: they learned it very quickly. as for the language 
that uses the simple computational principle, they could solve it, but it was a 
puzzle. so, different areas of the brain were activated, not the normal language 
areas. there is comparable work with aphasics, actually with idiot savant cases, 
cases of a person who has tremendous, fantastic, language abilities, but very 
limited cognitive abilities. neil smith has done work on it4. somewhat similar 
studies that are behavioral and not neurolinguistic found essentially the same 
as what andrea moro found with the investigation of the activation of brain 
areas. the normals could solve the invented language problems that violated 
universal grammar, but in a complicated way: they treated it like any other 
puzzle. the idiot savants, the one with limited cognitive abilities but excellent 
language abilities, couldn’t solve it at all. they can’t solve puzzles. this evidence 
from neuroscience compared with evidence from behavioral studies provides 
independent and very significant evidence that languages just don’t use simple 
computational procedures. They don’t use linear order, linear distance, fixed 
positions. that tells you something about the language faculty. that is the 
4  on idiot savants, see smith & tsimpli (1995), where the case of christopher is described.
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kind of neurolinguistic work which can be very significant, I think. A lot turns 
on the question of whether languages use linear order: first semantics, first 
syntax, do they have rules that involve linear order, linear position? there 
is a lot of linguistic consequences to that choice. neurolinguistic evidence 
conforms to other evidence in indicating that, if you want to understand the 
human language faculty, you have to ask what property is it that would lead 
automatically to use of structural position and structural distance, while 
ignoring linear position and linear distance. and there are interesting results 
about that, i think.
that relates very closely to the question of what small changes would have 
taken place that would have led to the sudden appearance of language in 
the first place. For those of you that know the linguistic literature, what is 
suggested in both cases is that the change that took place was the sudden 
emergence of the simplest combinatorial operation that is unbounded in 
scope. it is an operation that takes two entities already constructed and 
forms out of them the simplest possible new entity, the simplest possible 
will not involve linear order, because that is more complicated, it won’t 
involve any changes in the two entities put together, and in fact what it will 
form is just the set of the two, and that turned out to give you the basis. an 
operation like that is embedded somehow in every computational system: 
it is the simplest one possible and it does give you an unbounded array of 
hierarchical structure, and any property of the system that is emerging 
will depend on structural and not linear distance, structural and not linear 
position5. that has plenty of consequences.
3) What is the role of the notion of simplicity in modern formal linguistics, i.e., 
in technical terms, Minimalism? Is it the end or the starting point?
simplicity is simply the core notion of science. that goes back to galileo. he 
argued that nature is simple and it is the task of the scientist to show it. When 
you look at phenomena, they look extremely complex and diverse, and the task 
of the scientist is to show that this is a superficial misunderstanding: if you look 
more deeply, you will somehow figure out that there are simple elegant rules 
and principles. the whole of science is based on that. if you do not do that, you 
are not doing science, you are collecting data, you are flower collecting, which 
is ok, but this is not science. Furthermore, there is a substantial philosophical 
literature in this respects (goodman6 and others) which shows that the search 
for simplicity is identical with the search for explanation, and you can see 
5  this operation is technically called “merge” (chomsky 1995).
6  the reference is to the philosopher nelson goodman, broadly known for the “grue and 
bleen paradox”, introduced to highlight certain problems of induction (goodman 1954).
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why, even superficially: the more complex your account the less deep the 
explanations. if you can make your account simpler, your explanations are 
deeper, and the whole purpose of rational inquiry is to find explanations, 
science as well. that is the driving force behind the study of language as well, 
and what is called “minimalism” – maybe the name shouldn’t have been given 
to it – is just the latest stage in the effort to try to find simpler explanations7. 
it is a seamless continuation of everything that has been done in the study of 
language at least for the last 60 years, since the modern study took shape. in 
the early days, 60 years ago, it looked as if languages were extremely complex 
and very diverse: almost anything you can imagine could happen. over the 
years it has been gradually found that, if you look at it properly, diversity is 
much more constrained and there are very limited options for change, and the 
things that look very complex on the surface often have deeper explanations 
that work. the case that i mentioned is just a quite interesting one: the fact that 
simple computational procedures are not used but rather things like structural 
distance and structural position. that tells you a lot: one of the things that 
it tells you is that the core operation in language is the one i mentioned, the 
simplest computational operation which could have emerged from some simple 
mutation, but here we are getting into questions about genetics and brain 
science that are not understood8. But it is quite possible that some very simple 
mutation could have rewired the brain to provide the simplest computational 
operation, which is unknown in the organic world, since it appears in the 
language and nowhere else.
4) Doesn’t memory structure constrain grammar as the sensory-motor and the 
conceptual-intentional  
external systems do?
memory structure certainly constrains usage, in fact humans have quite 
limited memory as compared with a number of other organisms, for 
example certain birds like crows. a crow can remember where it has hidden 
10 or 20 thousand seeds, and not only where it has hidden them, but what 
quality the seed was, so that it will go first after the seeds that are going 
to deteriorate more quickly. Furthermore, the crow pays attention to 
other animals around that might see it hiding the seed and, if it sees that 
there is another crow around, it will wait that it goes away and re-bury 
the seed somewhere else. these are feats of memory that are absolutely 
unconceivable for humans: humans can get up to about 7 not 20 thousand: 
7  on the origin of the term minimalism, which aims at reducing linguistic levels to the 
minimum number required by virtual conceptual necessity, see moro (1996).
8  For an extensive discussion on computational operations, see de Palma (1974) and chesi 
(2012).
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that is an order of magnitude difference. the narrowness of memory is 
so that the number 7 is almost uniform across organisms (crows happen 
to be unusual): 7 plus minus 2 is a famous formula in the study of short-
term memory that goes back to george miller, 50 years ago9. humans are 
in that range, a normal range, and that does constrain things you can say: 
it constrains numbers that you can add in your head, for examples. But 
that tells you nothing about language, just as it tells you nothing about 
your knowledge of arithmetic. your knowledge of arithmetic enables you 
to add numbers of arbitrary size, and you can demonstrate that: if you 
give a person more memory and more time (say paper and pencil), there 
is no limit on the size of the numbers you can add. that tells you that 
you have an internal procedure,  technically it is called the “generative 
procedure”, which assigns a sum to any two arbitrary numbers. But 
memory constraints and time constraints limit how far you can go 
in real-time. you can go on and on indefinitely, if you have more and 
more time. language is exactly the same. there is no indication that 
memory plays any role in the nature of language any more than it 
does in the nature of arithmetical knowledge. But of course, it plays a 
role in your use of language, just like in your use of your ability to do 
arithmetic, or any other generative process. We have to distinguish 
between the nature of the system and the use of the system: this is a very 
fundamental difference. in the study of language, this is often called 
the difference between “competence” and “performance”: your internal 
knowledge, i.e., the internal structure, and what you do. it is considered 
a controversial distinction, but this has to be a confusion, since it is a 
conceptual distinction that cannot be avoided. there is a comparable 
distinction that is so obvious that it is just taken for granted everywhere 
else in biology. suppose someone is studying the digestive system and 
doesn’t know exactly how the digestive system works, i.e., the nature 
of the system: you don’t just look at the performance, like if the person 
has intestinal f lu or if he just ate a big meal; you don’t pay attention to 
that, you abstract away from it, if you want to understand the nature of 
the system. that is so obvious that it is never mentioned: it is just taken 
for granted in all inquiry. But when you talk about language, for some 
reasons, rational assumptions dissolve very quickly. it is typical when 
we talk about ourselves: it can be very hard to be rational. But if you use 
normal rational standards, the distinction is obvious and it tells you 
where memory plays a role as far as we know: not in the organization of 
the system but in the use of the system, of course.
9  see miller (1956).
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5) What do you think is the most critical computational aspect of language for 
a computer program that aims at understanding it?
First of all, no computer program should aim at understanding language, 
because that is utterly hopeless. it is much too elevated goal. We don’t even 
know what understanding language means. you can’t try to construct a 
program that does something that you can’t characterize: that is not a 
feasible task. understanding of language involves some many complex 
things that we have no grasp of: it is not a formulable task. you can 
ask narrower questions. For example, you can construct a computer 
program that will determine from the sequence of sounds or some other 
representations the internal structure of the object that you construct 
in your mind that gets interpreted in ways that we don’t understand. 
that you can do: it is called a “parsing program”, technically, and it raises 
interesting questions. Just to go back to the question of linear order that 
i have mentioned, a parsing program would be much simpler if it could 
use things like linear order: say in the sentence “instinctively eagles 
that fly swim”, a program that will tell you that “instinctively” goes 
with “fly” will be far simpler that the one that we use that tells you that 
it goes with “swim”. But language doesn’t offer this possibility; in fact 
there is a striking conflict – we find over and over – between language 
design and ease of use of language. They are in conflict. Language is 
designed in ways that increase the difficulty of use. Put it differently, 
communicative efficiency and computational efficiency conflict in many 
cases, and those are quite interesting cases: in every single case that 
is known computational efficiency wins and communicative efficiency 
loses. so whatever language is about, it doesn’t really care much about 
communication: it cares about internal elegance, being a simple system. 
and if you think about how language must have evolved, very recently, 
that makes sense: it was an almost instantaneous emergence. Whatever 
happened at that interesting moment, 75 thousand years ago, under no 
external pressure, no selectional pressure – it just happened in somebody’s 
brain, it would naturally take the simplest possible form. using an analogy 
that i have used occasionally and that andrea has used, it should become 
like a snowflake: it just takes the simplest form that the proprieties of 
physics forces it to take. that is what seems to have happened: in so far 
as we understand anything about language, it seems to take the simplest 
form and not care much about the consequences for use, in particular 
for communication. there is a lot of evidence pointing to that, and it has 
many interesting consequences. to go back to the literature on evolution 
of language, it bears on that too: standard view is that language evolved 
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as a means of communication, but the evidence is overwhelmingly against 
that. it seems to have developed in a way that harms communication and 
doesn’t care about communication. it does care about elegance, which 
makes sense if you think about the two or three facts that we have about 
the conditions for the emergence of the language faculty. all this hangs 
together pretty reasonably.
 
6) What is complexity in language? And in thought?
To answer the question about either language or thought, we first have 
to say what they are. you can’t answer questions about something when 
you have no idea of what it is. in the case of language, we can say some 
things, there are some ideas about what the essential nature of languages 
is. What is complexity in language? if we adopt the galilean guideline for 
the sciences, complexity in language is whatever we don’t understand: if 
you don’t understand something, it is complex. What you are trying to do 
is to show that it is your failure to understand that gives the impression of 
complexity: that is the nature of rational inquiry, science in particular. so 
there is plenty of complexity in language; pick anything random out of a 
page and it is very complex, which simply means that we don’t understand 
enough. But that is true of everything you look at in the world. that is why 
physicists don’t take video tapes of what is happening in the worlds and 
try to develop theories: this is way too complex. in fact, there is a standard 
joke in mathematics, that the only numbers are 1, 2, 3 and infinity, because 
anything else is just too complicated to study. in the case of physics, 
hydrogen you can study, helium maybe, but, if it gets bigger than that, you 
give it to the chemist and they will worry about it. if an organic molecule 
is too big or complicated for a chemist, you give it to the biologist; if it is 
too big for the biologist, you give it to historians; so it goes. you can study 
simple things, and when they get too complicated it gets harder, which 
means that you don’t understand enough. that is the nature of things.
that is language. What about thought? you can’t do this for thought, until 
someone tells you what thought is. What is thought? We can say a couple of 
things about those aspects of thoughts that are expressed in language, but 
then we are talking about language. What about those aspects of thought 
that aren’t expressed in language? What do we know about them? actually 
what we know about them is mostly from introspection. i am sure that i 
am not the only person in the world who has the experience of knowing 
what i want to say but not thinking of how i can say it: “i know what i 
mean but I can’t find the way to say it”, and you try something that didn’t 
work, maybe you try something else, maybe it is a little better, maybe you 
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end up with some complicated paraphrase because you couldn’t figure 
out the right way to say it. that is a normal experience. experience is like 
that. it tells you something: that there are a lot of things going on beyond 
the level of consciousness that we try to move to consciousness and even 
to the external world, often failing, which means that there is a lot of 
thought going on, and we have no grasp of it. until there is some way to 
capture these things that are beyond the level of consciousness, which 
is probably almost everything in our cognitive world, there is nothing 
to say. there is other evidence about this that has been misinterpreted, 
i think. in the last couple of years ago, there were experiments showing 
that, when people make decisions, for example when i decide to pick up 
this cup, milliseconds before i make the decision, there is activity in the 
brain in the areas where you are going to act, i.e., milliseconds before i 
make the decision, the motor areas of the brain are already organized 
to pick the cup up. that evidence was used widely to conclude that this 
shows that we don’t have free will10. But this doesn’t show anything of 
this sort. this just shows that decisions are unconscious. We all know 
that, if we think for a minute: of course decisions are unconscious. some 
of them reach the level of consciousness, some of them we can’t even act 
on, but there is a lot there going on unconsciously, probably everything 
of interest, and we don’t know how to deal with it. in principle it could 
be studied, maybe some day brain scientists reach the point where they 
can say something about this: it doesn’t seem beyond the possibility of 
inquiry. But we have to overcome some dogmas. there is one dogma that 
has hampered psychology back hundreds of years: that is the dogma 
that contents of thought are accessible to consciousness. it is hard to 
find anyone in the history of psychology or philosophy who has doubted 
this, even Freud. Freud talked a lot about the unconscious, but the whole 
Freudian system is based on the assumption that you can tease out what 
is unconscious. that is the point of psychoanalysis: they try to make what 
is unconscious, conscious. But if you try to find somebody who questioned 
that, it is not easy; the only person i have ever found is Vico. this dogma 
is almost certainly false. We know that from our own experience. going 
back to the question, until we have something to say about thought, we are 
not going to be able to ask questions about its complexity, its simplicity, its 
properties, or anything else.
10  to this respect, see the studies of the neurophysiologist Benjamin libet on voluntary 
movement (libet 1985). on the implications of this type of evidence for the notion of free will, see 
Pietrini & Bambini (2009).
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7) What comes first? Language or thought? Do they share a recursive 
structure?
it is the same question: until we have something to say about thought, we 
are not going to be able to give any serious answer. the only answer we can 
give is the one i have already mentioned: you simply pay attention to your 
own internal cognitive activity, speaking, planning, deciding, and so on. 
and i think you invariably come to the conclusion that something is going 
on beyond the level of consciousness. Probably, everything interesting is 
going on there. that is thought, if you like, and, whatever it is, it is coming 
before language, before deciding, before acting: it is just going on inside. But 
what is it? Well, it is a task for the future.
8) What is the place of context in language functioning? For example, 
metaphors are context dependent. Do they lay outside the language faculty?
interpretation of metaphors, like interpretation of everything else, is context-
dependent and lies outside the language faculty, specifically, unless by the 
language faculty you mean all of our cognitive abilities11. so, yes that would be 
true of metaphors, but it is also true of non-metaphors. Whatever you interpret 
in literal sentences goes way beyond the language faculty. again, there are a lot 
of dogmas about this. 
9) Why is it so difficult to explain that the difference between human and animal 
language lies the syntax?
That relates to the previous question. First of all, it is difficult to explain 
anything about language, because people have religious attitudes towards 
their language, religious dogmas about their language, as about almost 
anything else that is deeply personal. so you just feel you know everything: 
“you can’t tell me anything, i can speak perfectly and i don’t have any 
problem, there can’t be any difficulties about it, so stop bothering me 
with all your complicated theories”. that is very normal. you take a look 
at modern philosophy of language and it is full of this. People spell out 
their untutored intuitions about language and think they are saying 
something, because how could it be complicated? you could say the same 
about vision. What could be complicated about vision? “i see things, i don’t 
have any problems with it”. if you try to explain to people that the way 
you see things is because of quite complex computations that take place in 
the visual system, there is interesting experimental work which with you 
can sometime convince people. somehow this goes back to unconscious 
11  on the constellation of cognitive abilities involved in interpreting metaphor and context-
dependent meanings in general, see Bambini et al. (2011).
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knowledge. the mammalian visual system, humans and other mammals 
that have been studied, has a way of interpreting objects in motions 
as rigid12. in standard experiment, if you give a person tachistoscopic 
presentation, like a screen with a couple of dots on it, maybe three dots, if 
you give them three or four successive presentations of three dots on the 
screen, what you see is a rigid object in motion. you can’t help that: that 
is just the way the visual system works, which is kind of strange in a way. 
in the whole history of mammals, going as far back as you like, there was 
never any experience with rigid objects: rigid objects come in what is called 
“carpentered universes”, in modern universes where people construct 
things. if you are walking around in a forest, there aren’t any rigid objects. 
But our eyes and visual systems in all other mammals are constructed so 
that all of this completely unconscious activity is going on inaccessible to 
consciousness, which is giving a kind of a framework for visual perception. 
try to explain that to somebody about cognitive abilities like language and 
they would just resist it: “it can’t be. i know everything, don’t bother me”. 
it is hard to explain anything about language, unless somebody is willing 
to take on the attitude of the standard scientist: my intuitive judgments 
don’t mean anything, maybe my intuitive judgment is that a heavy rock 
falls faster than a small rock; if i want to be serious, i put aside this intuition 
because it has been disproved. unless you can make that leap, nothing can 
be explained.
What about the special role of syntax? the fact that matters is that human 
syntax has no counterpart in the animal world, none. no one has ever 
found any remotely like it. this fundamental combinatorial process that 
i mentioned simply appears nowhere else, at least anybody has been able 
to detect. But is that the difference between animals and humans? Well it 
is a difference, it is only one of many. if you take even the simplest word 
of language, the simplest one you like, “river”, “cup”, “person”, whatever 
it is, there is absolutely no analogue in animal communication. animal 
communication has essentially a 1 to 1 association between a symbol and 
some physically detectable set of circumstances. take monkey calls: monkey 
might have five calls. One of them is reflexively produced when leaves 
are moving: it is a warning call, we interpret that as meaning “predator 
is coming”. leaves are moving, this call comes out: it is like seeing a rigid 
object in motion. another call comes out because of some hormonal activity: 
we interpret its meaning as “i am hungry”. in every animal communication 
system that is known the symbols are like that. human words are nothing 
12  see the work on visual perception by david marr (1982) and shimon ullman (1979), and 
specifically Ullman’s rigidity principle.
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like that, not remotely even. you cannot give the physical characterization 
of what it means to be a river, or a person, or a cup. all of these concepts, 
even the simplest ones, depend on internal interpretations in terms of 
function, design, intentions, psychic continuity, all sorts of things. and 
every infant grasps this instantaneously, and in fact fairy tales are based 
on it. standard fairy tale has some prince turned by the wicked witch into 
a frog and he stays this way until the beautiful princess kisses the frog 
that becomes the handsome prince. during the interim period the physical 
characterization of the object was a frog, with all physical properties of 
the frog. But the child understands it as the prince: it just happens to look 
like a frog. that means that the concept of person is based on an intuitive 
notion of psychic continuity, which has no physical characterization, and 
that is instantaneous: no child has ever been confused about this. that is 
true for every word you look at. so, it is true that the syntax is different for 
the humans and animals, but so it is for everything else about language, 
including the meaning of the simplest words. this is another dogma, very 
resistant to reason and evidence, which has prevented the understanding 
of this. it is sometimes called the “referential doctrine”: the idea that there 
is a relation between words and things, an association between a word and 
the thing, that runs through philosophy of language and history of inquiry 
into the subject in recent years. That is just flatly false. There is no such 
relationship. in fact that was known to aristotle, but it has been forgotten. 
if you look back at aristotle, he asks: what is a house? in the aristotelian 
framework, a house consists of the interaction of two substances: the one 
is “matter” – house is something that is built out of bricks and wood and 
so on, its materials aspect – and the other is what is called “form”, design 
and function – it is used for a place for people to live in. if form and matter 
coincide, you get a house. But form is not physically detectable. and in fact 
the Aristotelian definition, though is correct as far as it goes, it just doesn’t 
begin to reach the meaning of house. But that is the right idea. that was 
understood pretty well until the 17th century, like a lot of things that were 
understood then and that are almost totally forgotten. until those insights 
are recovered, it is going to be impossible to study this question. 
But to go back to the question itself, it is true that syntax sharply 
separates human language from animal communication, so does the 
interpretation of the simplest atomic elements, so does everything else. 
animal communication systems are – as the term indicates – used for 
communication. For human language that just doesn’t seem to be a central 
property. it is certainly one of things you can do with language, just as you 
can watch television with your eyes. But that is not a core property and 
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there is plenty of evidence for that, of the kind i mentioned. so, in every 
respect it is just some novel thing in the organic world. i mentioned this 
morning descartes: i think he was basically right in thinking that this is the 
dividing between humans and the rest of the organic world, something that 
happened very recently13.
10) What is the difference between syntax in music and syntax in language? If 
they are alike, is it plausible that they have coevolved?
it is very plausible. language is universal among humans. there is no human 
group that has been found that doesn’t have a language very much like ours. 
in fact, languages are even invented by children with zero evidence. there 
are some remarkable cases. i will mention one case which is well studied. 
it is now known – it wasn’t known 50 years ago – that sign languages are 
almost identical to spoken languages: they have the same structures, same 
rules, same acquisition rate, same neural representation even, which is a 
little surprising because they are visual. there is one well studied case of a 
group of three cousins, in Philadelphia, whose parents were indoctrinated 
into the prevailing so-called oralist tradition: deaf children should not be 
permitted to use gesture, they have to learn lip reading. the idea behind 
this is crazy but it was the prevailing ideology in raising children with 
deafness. these parents were so deeply indoctrinated that they never made 
gestures, they walked around the house with their hands behind their 
backs so that the kids wouldn’t see any gesture. these three kids played 
together and it turned out, around the age of 3 or 4, that they invented a 
sign language: they developed a sign language and they were just using it. 
they were immediately taught american sign language, but the language 
was studied and it was about the same of any other language at that 
developmental level14.
actually, the first study of this was one of a friend of mine, back when 
i was a graduate student, eric lenneberg, who went on to develop the 
field of biology of language15. When he was a graduate student, back in 
the early 1950s, he was getting interested in the acquisition of language 
under a variety of conditions, and particularly language of the deaf. he 
went to visit a prestigious school for the blind and deaf in Boston, called 
13  in the morning of september 15, chomsky gave the inaugural lecture at the institute for 
advanced study, iuss, on language and limits of understanding, considering also descartes’s view on 
language and human creativity.
14  on deaf children spontaneously developing a sign system, see goldin-meadow & Feldman 
(1977) and goldin-meadow (2003).
15  on the biological foundation of language development, including the condition of 
congenital deafness, see lenneberg (1967; 1969).
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the Perkins school16. it was oralist, like everything was: no sign language, 
just lip reading. he just sat in on a class and he noticed that, as soon as 
the teacher turned to the blackboard, the kids started signing to each 
other. obviously the kids had invented a sign language, somehow. there 
was no way to study it at that time, but it is very likely, it is spontaneous, 
you can’t help it.
music is the same. as far as the anthropological evidence indicates, no 
human group has been found that hasn’t developed a pretty complex 
system of music. it may not be tonal music. it might be rhythm based or 
something else. But some kind of system of music seems to be universal, 
which is very curious because what function does it have? Why should 
there be music? a similar question arises about arithmetical knowledge. 
that is also universal. this is something that bothered darwin and Wallace, 
founders of evolutionary theory, because it seems to violate the principle 
of natural selection. how could arithmetical knowledge have evolved, since 
it has never been used? it has only been used in a tiny period of human 
history, and only among very few people. how come that everybody has 
it? and where is the good evidence that this is universal? that looked 
problematic. the only sensible answer that has been proposed is that all of 
these are offshoots of the same cognitive system. some cognitive system 
that emerged, which led to arithmetic, music, language, and any other 
behavioral pattern that has this basic properties and is universal. there are 
some reasons to believe that the combinatorial operation that i mentioned 
before actually does underlie all of them. For arithmetic, it is pretty easy 
to show, for music it is more complicated, but there is some work on it. in 
the last 40 years there has been a certain amount of work on the syntax of 
music, trying to relate it to the syntax of language. The first major studies 
were done by leonard Bernstein, american well known composer and 
conductor. there was a lecture in harvard, back in the early 1970s17. since 
then there has been a certain amount of work. one of my colleagues in my 
department, david Pesetsky, is one of the people that has done the main 
work on this18. it is an interesting topic. you can see how it ought to end up. 
But trying to show that what ought to be true is true, is never an easy task.
11) What is your position about the new theories of embodied language? In 
16  the Perkins school for the Blind was established in 1829. Famous students at the Perkins 
school were anne sullivan and helen Keller. 
17  Bernstein delivered six lectures at harvard in 1973, broadcasted in 1976 and available also 
as a book (Bernestein 1976).
18  as a representative reference, see Katz & Pesetsky (2009), which follows the path 
inaugurated by the seminal work of ray Jackendoff and Fred lerdhal (lerdhal & Jackendoff 1983).
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particular, what do you think about the relationships between the motor 
system and semantics? 
that is a quick one. i don’t have any position. “semantics” is a pretty loose 
term. if by “semantics” you mean everything involved in interpretation of 
language, then it would be pretty strange if it didn’t have some relation to 
motor systems and everything else. What that relation might be, i am not 
aware of any more than superficial observations relating them. I am afraid 
i have to say the same thing about embodied language: that is another 
popular topic. if you think about things like emotions and reactions to 
things and so on, what has that to do with language? a lot, it has a lot 
to do with the use of language, trivially, but does it have to do with the 
structure of language, the principles that determine the infinite structure 
of an interpretative expression? as far as i am aware, nobody has thought 
of a connection and it would be pretty hard to imagine one. they just seem 
quite different systems19.
19  a discussion on embodied cognition theories with respect to the language faculty can be found 
in tettamanti & moro (2012).
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